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I~ THE CUPREME COURT OF THE STATE GF UTAH 
WILLIAM DEAN ROGERS and 
PATRICIA LEE ROGERS, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
M. 0. BITNER CO., a Utah 
corporation, BLAINE B. BITNER, 
WESTCOR, INC., a Utah corporation, 
DOUGLAS MONSON, RICHARD F. JOHNS, 
III, D. MURPHY, F. ALONZO BADGER, 
UTAH SECURITY MORTGAGE, BONNEVILLE 
THRIFT COMPANY, ROYAL K. HUNT, JOHN 
S. DAVIS, and HAROLD H. BENNETT, 
Civil No. 19224 
Defendants-Appellants, 
Cross-Claimants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BENNETT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit was initiated by the plaintiffs who sought 
damages from various defendants arising out of Plaintiffs' 
purchase of two lots in a Park City Subdivision. Respondent 
Harold H. Bennett was made a party to the original lawsuit 
because of Bennett's claim to a lot purchased by Plaintiffs. 
Bennett filed a crossclaim against other defendants alleging 
that he had been fraudulently induced to lend money for the 
benefit of the developers of the Park City subdivision and 
that such obligation was not paid. 
Bitner Co. began the work necessary to pre pa re a s ubd i ·:is i· 
plat and obtain official approval of that plat from Summtt 
county. (Blaine Bitner, Tr. 126-127; Ex. 76-D). By earl 1··· 
all planning and engineering work necessary for preliminary 
approval of the project had been done and preliminary apnrova 
of the plat was granted by Summit County in about Februar~·, 
1978, subject to the submission of a bond or escrow aaree:ner.t 
to guarantee the financing necessary to construct the subdiv1•: 
improvements. (Blaine Bitner, Tr. 128, 483). Up to that po1"•t. 
all work had been undertaken by Bitner Co. as a sole venture. 
(~, Tr. 484-487). 
7. Before and after preliminary approval for the subd1· io. 
plat had been granted, Bitner Co. had discussions with various 
parties about the possibility of participating in the proJect. 
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 486-487; Leland Bitner, Tr. 941). In 
about the spring of 1978, an agreement was almost reached 
with one party that was described as a "joint venture". It 
would have provided for a 60/40 split of the gross proceeds 
from lot sales. Bitner Co. would have contributed the land a~ 
the subdivision plat and the other party would have out up tr.E 
cost to construct the subdivision improvements. (Blaine B1 ·.::e: 
Tr. 491-495). This offer was eventually rejected by the Bitr.e· 
Co. because the other party required the title to the land t 
be put up as collateral for a loan to pay for the subdivis1r 
improvements. 
Tr. 1024). 
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 129, 495; Leland Bitner, 
8. On or about November 1, 1978, Bitner Co. signed an 
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agreement with Westcor concerning the subdivision development. 
(Ex. 2 3) . That agreement consisted of a Uniform Real Estate 
contract and several additional pages titled "Exhibits", plus 
another page titled "Supplemental Agreement" that apparently 
was added at some unknown later date. (Douglas Monson, Tr. 
357-358). The essential features of this agreement were the 
following: 
(a) The sale price stated for the land was based 
on an anticipated profit share from sale of lots in the 
completed subdivision development. (Blaine Bitner, Tr. 
137-138, 232). According to Westcor, at least, that 
profit share was a 60/40 split of the anticipated gross 
sales. The price bore no relation to the value of the 
entire tract as undeveloped land. (Douglas Monson, Tr. 
272; John Davis, Tr. 1112). 
(b) The Uniform Real Estate Contract was used at the 
insistence of Bitner Co. on advice of its accountants 
principally so it could claim certain tax benefits 
incident to installment sales of land. (Blaine Bitner, 
Tr. 236-237). 
(c) The term of sale concerning the land stated 
a principal amount only. No down payment was required 
and no interest was charged on the unpaid balance under 
the terms of the contract although an accountant for 
Westcor testified that interest was carried on Westcor's 
books. (Douglas Monson, Tr. 272, Ex. 23, p. 7). No 
minimum periodic payment was required either. Instead 
a maximum annual payment was specified that was a require-
ment for claiming the tax benefit mentioned above. (Ex. 
23-P, p. 4). The agreement further provided that payment 
for the land was to be made either from a percentage of 
the funds received from individual lot sales or by 
assignment of executed lot sale contracts. (Douglas 
Monson, Tr. 270-272; Ex. 23, p. 4). 
(d) Principals of the Bitner Co. and Westcor were 
expressly allowed to sell lots and were entitled to a 
commission for any sold. (Ex. 23-P, p. 7). Pursuant to 
that provision, Bitner Co. put a billboard on the property 
facing the adjacent I-15 freeway advertising lots for 
sale and listing the phone number of three principals of 
Bitner Co. (Blaine Bitner, Tr. 144; Dean Rogers, Tr. 
69-70; Ex. 19. Those principals of the Bitner Co. even-
tually sold nearly one-third of all the lots in the 
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subdivision, for which they were paid sales coITITTi:o;s10c1 
of more than $12, 000 durinq the oeriod of December, ['l-
to February, 1979. (Blaine Bitner, Tr. 143, 217; St,;r.J, 
Kilbourne, Tr. 171). 
(e) Westcor was to be responsible for arranu1n 1 
the financing for construction of the subdivision 
improvements and for installing the same. If it was 
able to do that for less than the $284,000 estimated 
Summit County, then Bitner Co. was entitled to rece1:e 
one-half of those savings, plus one-half of any 
connection or similar fees that might be collected 
from the lot purchasers at a later time. (Blaine 
Bitner, Tr. 139-140, 234-235; Douglas Monson, Tr. 
2 7 3; Ex. 2 9 , p. 7) . 
(f) Westcor was required to complete constructioc 
of the subdivision improvements within one year follow1c: 
execution of the agreement. (Blaine Bitner, Tr. 199-2C 
Douglas Monson, Tr. 265; Ex. 23-P, p. 7). 
9. The entire project was completed and sold in 
accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by 
Bitner Co. previously. (Blaine Bitner, Tr. 231). 
10. After Bitner Co. and Westcor signed their agreen•e1,'. 
on November 1, Bitner Co. executed an Escrow Fund Agreement 
(Ex. 24-P) that was delivered to Summit County for the purrcoc 
of obtaning final approval of the subdivision plat. (Blair.e 
Bitner, Tr. 220). Although Westcor was supposed to make al~ 
financial arrangements incident to that document, Bitner Co. 
alone signed as the entity responsible for the development. 
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 139). Said agreement also contained recc'" 
sentations that Bitner Co. guaranteed completion of the sub-
division improvements within 24 months and that the sum of 
$284,000 was on deposit with defendant Utah Securitv ~ort 
to guarantee the timely completion of those improvement~. 
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 201-202). 
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11. In Januar/, 1979, more than two months after the 
Ritner Co. and Westcor agreement was signed, Bitner Co. executed 
the Protective Covenants of Park Ridge Estates that were recorded 
with Summit County (Ex. 27-P). (Blaine Bitner, Tr. 220). 
12. Except for some materials that were paid for by 
Westcor, all construction of the subdivision improvements in 
Park Ridge Estates was performed by a company owned and operated 
by Blaine B. Bitner, the president of Bitner Co. or by others 
under contract with Bitner Co. (Dean Rogers, Tr. 34; Blaine 
Bitner, Tr. 140-141). 
13. No funds had been or were later deposited to the 
escrow account at Utah Security Mortgage described in the 
aforementioned Escrow Fund Agreement (Ex. 24-P). (Douglas 
Monson, Tr. 395-396). 
14. Defendants Blaine Bitner, Douglas Monson, and John 
Davis testified that in February, 1980, certain lot owners 
initiated a lawsuit in the Summit County Court (Jim Lynn, et ux. 
v. Westcor, et al., Case No. 5985) that alleged among other 
things, fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the 
aforementioned Escrow Fund Agreement. Bitner Co., Blaine B. 
Bitner, Westcor and Douglas Monson (an officer of Westcor) were 
named defendants in that action and all were there represented 
by John Davis, just as in the instant case. (Blaine Bitner, 
Tr. 253; Douglas Monson, Tr. 348, 386). Those witnesses acknow-
ledged that they took the position in the Lynn case that their 
respective positions in connection with the Park Ridge project 
are identical, and that they consented to the entry of certain 
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orders in the Lynn case that imposed Joint and se·:crul lo 
on westcor and Bitner Co. for the filing of bonds arid 
tion of the improvements in Park Ridge Estates. 
Monson, Tr. 419-20; John Davis, Tr. 1104). Those Wltnc:c;.,, 
further acknowledged that in neither the Lynn action nor 
instant case have said defendants filed any crossclaims c,.:,, 
each other despite Bitner Co. 's denial in this action tl·"1' 
was a joint venturer with Westcor or otherwise responsi!~lt· 
the Park Ridge project after November 1, 1978. (Blaine f i '..cc 
Tr. 225-227; Douglas Monson, Tr. 384-385; John Davis, Tr. 1· 
15. On or about June 30, 1980, Bitner Co. and Westcur 
executed a new agreement entitled "Trust Agreement" (Ex. 2?-
that formalized negotiations conducted by the parties o•.·cr • -
past several months. (Blaine Bitner, Tr. 208-209, 2301 
provision of that agreement was that Bitner Co. would 3SSJ'0 
full, complete and sole responsibility for the Park P1J~~ IE 
ment and completion of the subdivision improvements t!ler·~1n, 
and hold Westcor and Douglas Monson harmless from any 11aL!l. 
arising out of the Park Ridge project. 
210-211, 537; Douglas Monson, Tr. 351) 
(Blaine Bitner, ~r. 
16. Construction of some of the subdivision irr.nro"'ec.C:" 
in Park Ridge was begun in the summer of 1979, but onl·,· 3 
cut of the road and a portion of the excavation and lJ" in 
sewer and water pipes was completed before the end 0 • th1• 
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 207). In the following :;ear, 1CJ8r1, 
vation and installation of the sewer and ~uter pipes ~"~ 
(Dean Rogers, Tr. 44). Construction of the '.'7ater rc:o•c1 ·:•Jl r 
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~ho remainder 0r ~he ~ater s~·stem, and the laying of road bed 
ind [Ji1'.'1n 1 of the roads •,;ere not crJmpleted until the spring 
!Dean Rogers, Tr. 86, 94) 
17. ~either Bitner ro. nor 3nyone associated with it had 
~n"· prior dealings or acouaintance with \vestcor or any of its 
orincipals. !Blaine Bitner, Tr. 130J. Prior to signing the 
;;ovember l, 1978 agreement with l'iestcor, Bitner Co. did not 
request or pursue any ivestigation of Westcor or its principals 
or the assets it would contribute to the Park Ridge development. 
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 132-136). 
18. Westcor was not incoroorated until January, 1979, 
more than two months after Douglas Monson signed the agreement 
with Bitner Co. as Westcor's vice president. (Douglas Monson, 
Tr. 1049-1050; Ex. 106). ~r. Monson testified that Westcor 
had only the statutory minimum of assets or capital when formed. 
(Douglas ~lonson, Tr. 266). ~o documents or records were produced 
to substantiate that there was ever a meeting of stockholders or 
directors, or that any resolution was ever adopted by the Board 
of Directors, or that any action was taken to form and maintain 
the corporation itself beyond filing the original Articles of 
Incorporation with the Lieutenant Governor's Office in January, 
1979. (Douglas ~1onson, Tr. 415-416). 
19. The payments received by Westcor from lot purchasers 
us monthly payments on lot purchase contracts, and from the 
ass1onment of such contracts to other parties, were used by 
IJouolas ~Jonson and \\1estcor in other business ventures or for 
other purposes having nothing to do with Park Ridge Estates, 
-9-
when obligations on Park Ridge Estates wer'' un::ci1cl '·' 
wise unsatisfied. (Douglas Monson, Tr. ii-:; 3i.~1~•t' 
Tr. 538; John Davis, Tr. 805). 
* * * 
2 5. During the summer of 1979, Blaine G1tr.er, 
president of Bitner Co. was fully a1vare that ;•laint1tfs ·.·,·1· 
constructing the two houses. (Blaine Bitner, Tr. 14_ 1 
Bitner's excavating company was at that time d1gginu the 
for the sewer and water pipes and lay1nc the same next •c 
plaintiffs' lots. (Blaine Bitner, Tr. 140-142). 
one occasion during that summer, Blaine Bitner and c.la1C'tL:·· 
William Dean Rogers had a conversation at the construct1c· 
and Mr. Rogers' testimony was that Blaine Bitner stc1t0d '" 
improvements would be complated before winter set rn. 
Rogers, Tr. 54-56). Later in 1979, and on a large "'°':--1 e· 
occasions prior to November 1980, plaintiffs contacted 2.;;; 
Bitner, other representatives of Bitner Co., and recrese: 
of Westcor, to notify them that the plaintr ffs' loan -.,·ec:·.' 
due, or were past due, and could only be paid by scile ~~ 
house, which could not be sold until the subdi·.'1sion i'.'"· :· 
were completed. Plaintiffs were repeatedly told by these 
that the improvements would be completed first w1th1n 10-., 
before the deadline stated in the Escrow Fund AGrcc~ent 
Summit County, November l, 1980. 
Patricia Rogers, Tr. 568-5701. 
* * * 
35. Prior to August 2, 1979, the defc,"lant 
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1-.. c~·c1nactcr "Uad·:.•r" I '>>1cd •.he defendant Harold H. Bennett 
(!-'.crc1:-,-1-=ter ''Gcr1:1~:-tt"1 ~_}1f_· surn of C:-81,078 t_,.lus interest. 
1 ,·~1onzo Sad::er, ';:'r. r;)')-()0 1); Harold Bennett, Tr. 841). 
36. Just r.rir~r to :.1Fr•1s'= 2, 1979 Badger contacted Bennett 
1nd rerresented that if Bennett would make a loan to Westcor, 
that he would recei·:e a11 3ssionment of contract receivables from 
t~c Park Pidae Estates S~bdiv1sion which would be sold to a third 
party financial institution to fund payment of the $81,078 plus 
interest, together with the loan to be made to Westcor. 
Badaer, Tr. 661-662; Harold Bennett, Tr. 845-846). 
(Alonzo 
37. On August 2, 1979 Be;onett made a loan of $50,000 to 
':iestcor b•/ promissor~z" note signed by Badger personally, and 
b;· Doualas ~lonso;o !hereinafter ":1onso'1") as president of Westcor. 
I Ex. 72-::>J . The loan was made on the represertation of both 
Badaer and Monson acting for ~est=or, that the entire obligation 
of $131,078, beina the existina Badger obligation, and the 
SS0,000 referred to on the promissory note, would be paid in 
full, on or before :·io•:meber 30, 1979. (Douglas Monson, Tr. 297, 
1 1159; Alonzo Badaer, Tr. 665; Harold Bennett, Tr. 852-853). 
38. The aforementioned aoreement was supported by con-
sideration since Bennett would not have made the additional loan 
o~ 550,000 but for the aareene'1t of both Badger and Monson 
1 3ctir.·:i on behalf of cvf'stco:c) that by making the loan, the entire 
oblication o~ 5131,078 nlus interest would be paid in full. 
1:,lonzo Badcer, Tr. 6b7; Harold Bennett, Tr. 844, 854, 859) 
39. In orJer to crovide furds to pay the obligation, 
Badaer and Monson crovided assianmencs of contract and/or note 
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receivables on lots in the Park Ridc;e Estates s :Ln!i'.·1:-; 
covering Lots 12, 13, 16, 17, 28, 29, 32, 36, 39, HJ, 41, 
51, 53, 61, and 62, representing that the same had a tut 11 
value, then due and owing of $208, 348.48, sufficient t." 
$131, 078 obligation, together with interests. (Dou·; las .,, 
Tr. 305; Alonzo Badger, Tr. 668; Exs. 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 
51, 53, 55, 57, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67 and 69). 
40. Badger and Monson (acting on behalf of Westcor) 
represented that the contract receivables would be sold to a 
third party financial institution by them, on Bennett's acco_-
and the entire obligation would be paid from the sale of t~E 
same, or in the alternative, that Bonneville Thrift Comoan· 
would purchase the contracts. (Douglas Monson, Tr. 303, 3'71: 
Alonzo Badger, Tr. 673-674; Harold Bennett, Tr. 845, 850: ?::.: 
41. At the time of the agreement between Bennett, P~~ 
and Westcor, Badger and Monson were partners and had anreeJ 
provide assistance to each other in the funding of Westcor. 
(Douglas Monson, Tr. 294, 395, 399; Alonzo Badger, Tr. 671, 
718) 
42. The $50,000 received by Westcor on Auc;ust 2, lq-J 
was used by Monson in Westcor and in develooment of the PArh 
Ridge Estates subdivision. (Douglas Monson, ir. 301, 1.7.:o-:· 
407; Alonzo Badger, 661; Ex. 68). 
43. On behalf of Westcor, Monson executed the ass1 ,,-,-c 
on all of the aforementioned contracts and/or note recc1· 
to Bennett, and maintained a list of the assionments ~1''· 
records of Westcor. 
Badger, Tr. 677). 
(Douglas Monson, Tr. 317, 350; .\lonzo 
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44. In relation to the aforementioned lot numbers assigned 
to Bennett, Monson lactina on behalf of Westcor) and Badger 
represented that each contract receivable was valid, current 
in payments, and was available for assignment. (Harold Bennett, 
Tr. 850). As to the following lots, the representations made 
were false from the inception: 
1. Lot 29. Lot 29 was a contract receivable repre-
sented to be due and owing from William Dean Rogers. 
Bennett received an assignment of real estate contracts 
receivable represented to be owing from Mr. Rogers on 
Lot 29. (Douglas Monson, Tr. 306). However, Lot 29 was 
not sold to William Dean Rogers but was in fact sold to 
a Ronald Jacobsen. In addition, the balance represented 
to be owing on said contract was not as represented. 
(Douglas Monson, Tr. 333-335; Ex. 70, Ex. 71). 
2. Lots 53, 61, and 62. As to Lots 53, 61, and 62, 
each of the contract receivables on said lots had been 
assigned to Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. on March 26, 
1979, several months prior to the August 2, 1979 agreement 
between Bennett, Monson (on behalf of Westcor) and Badger. 
(Doualas Monson, Tr. 325, 332-333; Ex. 66, 71). 
45. The court finds that Bennett was frauduently induced 
to enter into the August 2, 1979 agreement with Monson (on 
behalf of Westcor) and Badger, referred to in these Findings. 
This finding of fraud is based upon the following facts found 
by clear and convincing evidence: 
A. Badger and Monson/Westcor made representations 
to Bennett that if he would advance an additional $50,000 
that the entire amount of $131,078 plus interest would be 
paid from the proceeds of sales of contract rece~vables 
assigned to him. (Harold Bennett, Tr. 850). 
B. Badger and Monson/Westcor represented to Bennett 
that he should not record his assignments since the same 
would be immediately marketed and sold. (Douglas Monson, 
Tr. 319, 332; Alonzo Badger, Tr. 673). 
C. The assignments were in fact given to Bennett. 
He did not record the same based upon the representations 
of Badger and Monson/Westcor, and Bennett did advance the 
additional $50,000 which he borrwed from his own bank, 
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all in reliance on the representations of Monson.·,;, .. _, 
and Badger. (Harold Bennett, Tr. 855, 858). 
D. As evidence of the fraudulent intent of \lu" · 
(on behalf of Westcor) and Badger, the following ass1 • 
ments of the same contract receivables given to Bonr· 
were made to other individuals and entities as follo~ .. 
(1) Twenty-nine days after entering into the 
agreement with Bennett as described above, a10ci Y:· 
that Bennett had not recorded his assignments, ~oo­
assigned Lot Nos. 12, 13, 16, and 17 to Citizens ~. 
knowing that these had already been assianed tu Bee 
(Douglas Monson, Tr. 316-318, 376; Exs. 41, 43). 
Further, Monson gave no notice or warning of the 
further assignment of the contract receivables 
prior to doing so. (Douglas Monson, Tr. 318-319; 
Alonzo Badger, Tr. 675). 
(2) On February 13, 1980, Lot Nos. 29 and 51 
were assigned to Bonneville Thrift Co. by a docuDec 
containing the signature of Monson. (Ex. 49-D). 
(3) On November 28, 1979, at the request of 
Monson, Lots 39, 53, 61 and 62 were released to 
John S. Davis and were assigned to M. 0. Bitner 
Co., who in turn assigned them to other individua:: 
not a party to the above action. (Blaine Bitner, 
Tr. 245-246; Douglas Monson, Tr. 330; Exs. 29, 
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36). 
(4) On June 30, 1979 (sic) as president o~ 
Westcor, Monson assigned Lots 36, 40, 41, and 51 
to John S. Davis, as Trustee. (Douglas Monson, 
Tr. 321-324). 
E. Throughout the period that the defendants Bade• 
and Monson were making assignments of the same contrac~: 
previously given to Bennett, Bennett was maintaining 
periodic contact with both Badger and Monson concerni~= 
the status of the oayment of the agreed-upon obligation. 
During said contracts (sic) at no time did either. Bae! :e:· 
or Monson notify Bennett that assignments of his con-
tract receivables had been made to other individuals. 
(Douglas Monson, Tr. 332; Alonzo Badger, Tr. 675; Ha1·nl:'. 
Bennett, Tr. 857). 
F. The representations of Badger and Monsor,/',•ie3 ·_: 
were false and known to be so as is clearlv indicate~ L 
their actions in immediately assigning the. contracts 1: 
other individuals and entities knowina that an assi ~~e· 
of the same had already been made to Bennett. Bad'1 r 1: 
Monson/Westcor knew that Bennett had not recorded ~ ~ 
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assiqnments, and the represented receivable assigned to 
him would not be available to pay the obligation as 
promised. ( D:Juglas ~-bnson, Tr. 319; Alonzo Badger, Tr. 
676-678) 
G. The representations made by Badger and Monson/ 
Westcor were the only reason Bennett considered making 
the additional advance and did induce him to do so. 
(Harold Bennett, Tr. 854, 880-881) . 
H. Bennett made a reasonable inquiry and investiga-
tion into the receivables involved and based upon the 
representations that the contracts would be sold, that 
they were all current in payments, that he was dealing 
with the president of Westcor (the listed seller on 
the contract documents) Bennett acted reasonably and 
did not know the falsity of the representations when 
he relied upon the same. (Harold Bennett, Tr. 849-850, 
855, 868). 
I. By relying and being induced to act on the 
representations of Badger and Monson/Westcor, Bennett 
was damaged when the contract receivables were no longer 
available to be used by him or on his account to pay 
the aforementioned obligations. (Douglas Monson, 
Tr. 344; Harold Bennett, 855). (R. 766-772, 774, 
778-783). 
In reliance upon these Findings of Fact the court made 
its Conclusions of Law (R. 785-790) and subsequently entered 
a Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title. (R. 792-797). 
from this Judgment that the present appeal is taken by 
appellant M. 0. Bitner Co. ( R. 811) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING 
BITNER CO. JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE 
WITH DEFENDANTS WESTCOR, MONSON, AND 
BADGER AS TO THE CROSSCLAIM OF RESPONDENT 
BENNETT. 
It is 
Appellant Bitner Co. attacks the Judgment entered in 
favor of respondent Bennett on seven separate grounds. While 
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respondent Bennett believes that some of the ar·::i,~1e;it_,; 
by Appellant overlap and are not properl~· seoarable, f, ,, 
convenience of this Court, Respondent will address edc'; 
arguments raised by Appellant in its brief. 
pp. 32-40). The question of the representation of ,\p!•cllJ:1'. 
counsel will be discussed in a subsequent r::oint in tens ':ric 
(Appellants' Brief, pp. 40-44). 
A. The Findings of the Lower Court as to 
a Joint Venture Between Bitner Co. and 
Westcor is Based Cpon Substantial E·:idencc 
Which Must be Affirmed on Appeal. 
Appellant argues that the lower court erred in concluJ:-. 
that a joint venture existed between Bitner Co. and Westcor. 
It reincorporates the arguments advanced against the ola1nt,· 
that such joint venture did not exist. Appellant states, 
arguments are even stronger with regard to Bennett who ncvec 
had any contact with Park Ridge, he merely loaned mone:,· t'.J 
Westcor, Monson and Badger who purported to assign contract' 
to secure the loan." (Appellants' Brief, p. 32). 
Respondent Bennett believes that the arguments advance" 
by Appellant as to its claim that no joint venture exists 
been thoroughly treated in the Brief filed by respondents 
Rogers. (Brief of Plaintiffs, pp. 13-22). Respondent Scnc,, 
therefore, incorporates and adopts the reason1no advanced t 
them in their Brief. 
Some additional comments, however, arc appror.•::-1atc. 
it cannot be emphasized enough that the question as to ~net 
a joint venture exists is one of fact. Strand v. Crannc~ 
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) I t· ~~5 Ii tah 1980). Stone v. First Wyoming Bank, 625 
.2d 33~ (10th 
<' . 2 d 1 Jl 9 I\·<· o . 
Cir. 1980); P & M Cattle Co. v. Holler, 559 
1916 i . Only in those cases where but one 
inference can be drawn by a reasonable man can the question be 
decided as a matter of law. Long v. State Industrial Accident 
commission, 424 P.2d 236 (Ore. 1967). 
Second, the "existence of the joint venture must deoend 
upon the facts of each case and formality of agreement is less 
important than the acts and conduct of the parties, and the 
facts that exist in each particular case." Score v. Wilson, 
611 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1980); Strand v. Cranney, 607 P.2d 
295, 296 (Ctah 1980). 
Furthermore, the intent of the parties is controlling and 
is to be gleaned from the conduct, the surrounding circumstances, 
and the transactions between the parties. Stone v. First 
tJYoming Bank, 625 F.2d 332, 340 (10th Cir. 1980). 
It is also a well-settled rule for the factfinder to 
discard terminology utilized by the parties themselves in 
characterizing their relationship and, for example, the 
inclusion of the term "joint venture" in an agreement does not 
necessarily make it one if the elements of a joint venture are 
missing. Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales, Inc., 
~45 P. 2d 684 (Ctah 1982). Conversel•;, the exclusion of that 
term or the characterization b;· the parties that a joint venture 
does not exist is also not controllins since it is facts not 
characterizations that deter~ine the existence of a joint 
venture. .'1ercer •:. Vinson, 336 P. 2d 854 (Ariz. 1959). 
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Finally, this Court has applied the trad1tional ,11: 
of appellate review in cases involvir.q a Joint •:c:-.t ;r·:> 
and has held that where the trial court's f1ndiwF; and 
are supported by substantial, credible evidence they ar• 
to a presumption of correctness. Score v. Wilson, 611 !' .. ' 
367 (Utah 1980); Lynch v. MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464 (l'ta:1 l!• 
In such cases the findings and judament cannot be dist~r • 
on appeal. 
Further, this Court has the duty to review evidence 1r 
light most favorable to the trial court's findings and 1·1i 11 
disturb the trial court's determination as trier of fact 1~ 
weighing the credibility of the witnesses where reasonable ~ 
could differ as to the weight to be given to conflictic1·: ~· 
dence. Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Ctah 19/S!. 
Applying the preceding principles to the facts and t .. ~ 
findings in this case result in the inescapable conclusion 
that the lower court was justified in concluding that a JOI 
venture existed between Bitner Co. and Westcor. The lm·1er 
court in its Conclusions of Law summarized its basis for 
making this determination as follows: 
Taken together, the elements of the aareement 
between Bitner Co. and Westcor, and the actions of 
those parties, both jointly and severally and before 
and after entering into their agreement, constitut0 
a joint venture partnership. Of particular sicrn1 f ic· 1' 
to that determination are the de facto sharina of ,-· 
the combining of assets (the land---ar:ld de•.•e lorn;,en t 
by Bitner Co. and the financinq and construc~ion 
subdivision improvements by \'lestcor), the mutual r: "· 
to market lots in the project, the assumption of 
responsibility for the pro]ect by Bitner Co. as 
developer on several occasions after enterinc into 1· 
agreement with Westcor, the sharinq of savin~s from 
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installing the subdivision improvements, and the other 
instances enumerated in Findings of Fact No. 6 through 
15 (contained in this Brief, pp. 3-8, supra) where 
Bitner Co. retained substantial control and responsi-
bility over the Park Pidge project at all times. 
These numerous considerations, and the degree of 
shared responsibility and control generally, are 
consistent with a Joint uenture partnership and 
inconsistent with the claim of Oitner Co. that it was 
merely a seller of the undeveloped land that retained 
nothing more than a seller's security interest in the 
land after entering into the agreement with Westcor. 
(R. 786-787). 
It would serve no useful purpose to repeat the many factors 
which the lower court considered in determining that a joint 
venture existed. However, certain of the arguments now raised 
by Appellant in its brief must be briefly addressed. It should 
be observed that the appellant attempts to dissect the totality 
of circumstances which occurred during the entire transaction 
and focus upon specific clauses contained in the contracts or 
upon specific events. As noted earlier, however, it is the 
circumstances and facts viewed as a whole which determine a 
joint venture and not isolated instances pointed out by one or 
the other party. With this precept in mind, it remains to examine 
the specific arguments made by Appellant. 
There Was an Element of Loss. 
First, Appellant claims that there was no element of loss 
in the transaction and therefore no joint venture can be said 
to exist. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 12-13). The absence of 
"loss" language in the agreement is easily understood since 
neither party at the time the transaction was entered into 
thouaht they could sustain a loss. This belief, however, proved 
wrong as will be discussed. 
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As to Bitner Co. it refused to give up title to its ~ 
as had been proposed by other developers who wanted to jo111• 
venture the project. (Tr. 492, 1023-1024). Gilner Co. wcis 
definitely against these proposals since it would lose the 
interest in the land and be subordinated to the efforts of 
the developers. The offer by Westcor, however, was differcn· 
in that Bitner Co. retained title to the land and specifica": 
under the contract was to receive a percentage of the proceed, 
of the sale of each lot as it occurred. (Ex. 23-P, p. 4). 
Only when Bitner Co. received its full share of the proceeds 
of the sale was it required to give up title to its land. Ti'.'c; 
if Westcor was unable to sell the lots or did not fully devc:c 
the land as agreed, Bitner Co. lost nothing since it still 
retained the land and gained the benefit of any work and imorc-
ments actually made by Westcor. (Leland Bitner, Tr. 1025-102' 
Bitner Co. believed that Westcor was risking $284,400 
which it had supposedly deposited with Utah Security Mortgaae 
as an escrow as required by Summit County. Bitner Co. undout· 
believed that this escrow would protect it against any losses 
incurred as a result of Westcor's improvement work. This is 
the only explanation as to why Bitner Co. was not even cancer~ 
with any of the financial history or assets of Westcor since 
the officers of the company obviously assumed that the escroc 
amount was a sufficient contribution into the joint venture 
protecting Bitner Co. from any loss. 
Unbeknownst to Bitner Co. , however, Wes teer had di f ~ e c-e·· 
plans. Because of its arrangement with Utah Security Mortca· 
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owned b~ Alonzo Badger, a false certification of the escrow 
';;as made. Badger and Monson agreed that they would utilize 
the money obtained from the sales of the lots to cover the 
improvements and therefore no out-of-pocket money was required 
by either Badger or Monson once the false certificate of deposit 
had been made. (Tr. 702, 716). Under this arrangement Westcor 
had nothing to lose and everything to gain since it would pro-
vide the improvements only as the lots were sold. 
Had Westcor properly utilized the money obtained from the 
sale of the lots then this scheme would have succeeded. By 
diverting a portion of the funds from the sales of the lots, 
however, funds were not available to make the improvements and 
the subsequent lawsuits and other events therefore occurred. 
As Bitner Co. found out the old addage was true that 
"the best laid plans of mice and men oft go astray." Bitner 
Co. and its principals discovered subsequently that the lack 
of a real bond with Utah Mortgage Co. and the failure of 
Monson to do his agreed upon improvements created a true "loss" 
situation. Since it had signed the escrow agreement with Summit 
County and, even more importantly, was named as a defendant 
in a lawsuit by various property owners who were claiming 
damages for the loss of improvements being completed, it 
became necessary for the Bitner brothers to mortgage their 
various houses in order to come up with the court-ordered bond 
protecting the property owners. (Tr. 995-998). 
Thus, while it appeared to both Westcor (under the guise 
of its fraud) and to Bitner Co. that no loss could be sustained 
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to either party, the realities of the situation resuitod in 
Bitner Co. being liable for the misapprorriation ot fc1n,b ,, 
Westcor. These facts certainly give rise to the f 1nd1 nc; t;,,,., 
a joint venture agreement existedin spite of Appellant's 
assertion that the written words of the contract did not 
mention the word "loss". 
There Was Profit Sharing. 
Appellant argues that "Westcor was obligated to pa'/ 
Bitner Co. the total purchase price for the land no matter 
what the financial results of the development to Westcor woul: 
be. II (Appellants' Brief, p. 13). Under this theory Bitner ~ 
simply sold a piece of real estate to Westcor and had no 
further concern as to what occurred to it. Thus, accordin·: 
to the theory, if Westcor defaulted Bitner Co. could sue 
Westcor for its damages. 
This "theory" was argued to the court below which reJec:e 
it categorically. Such rejection was entirely proper. HaJ 
Bitner Co. been looking to Westcor as a buyer of undevelocei 
real estate it certainly would have investigated its financ1' 
status and been concerned as to whether it would have been 
able to develop the property and make the payments as the ~cc· 
tract required. However, this was not the case. A revie«"' r,~ 
the contract agreement shows that the $400,000 sales price 
merely a guesstimate of the anticipated profits that the 
division would bring in after it had been developed. 
The contract contemplated that the money fron the sal~ 
each lot would be divided as it accrued. There was no m1n1~: 
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f,,a·;n1L"1t required u!1rler thP contract nor was any interest charged. 
This open-ended contract therefore permitted Bitner Co. to 
receive half of the proceeds of the sale of the lots as they 
were sold thereb:/ automaticall/ making a "profit" with each 
sale. 
Since the lots were sold in accordance with the Bitner 
plans and specifications and the prices projected as to each 
lot, the $400,000 contract price included the built-in projected 
profits. The unusual nature of this contract arrangement clearly 
substantiated the lower court's finding that the contract price 
was really not material and that the arrangement was made in 
order to allow Bitner Co. the tax advantages of an installment 
contract sale (which is based not upon the stated contract 
sale price but upon the amount of each installment as it is 
received annually). 
The statement by Blaine Bitner that he had agreed to 
split the profits with Westcor (Tr. 234) and the statement made 
by Mr. Davis (as attorney for both parties in the Lynn case) 
to the same effect (Tr. 1112) directly contradicts the position 
now argued by Appellant. 
Finally, the fact that Bitner Co. and its partners were 
given financial rewards for selling lots and, in addition, were 
to be credited with any savings in the projected cost of develop-
ment indicated that Bitner Co. was indeed a partner in the 
development of this property and not merely a vendor of raw land. 
Bitner's Control Over the Development. 
Appellant next argues that Bitner Co. was to have no control 
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These documents together with the various court ord0rs 
the Lynn case requiring joint obligations D'/ both Westcor 
Bitner Co. clearly substantiate the lower court's conclu:"1 
that a joint venture existed and any claims to the contrar: 
are simply without merit. 
Finally, as to respondent Bennett, Appellant argues t~2· 
"Bitner Co. incurred no risk of loss and no profits from 
dealing with Bennett and had no control of any sort over a~ 
loan from Bennett. Bennett's transactions meet none of the 
joint venture criteria recognized by this Court with regard 
to Bitner Co." (Appellants' Brief, pp. 32-33) This misstate 
the applicable law relating to joint ventures. Once a joint 
venture has been established between Westcor and Bitner Co. 
it is immaterial whether Bitner Co. was aware of the develoc:cc-
obligation incurred by Westcor to Bennett. Bitner' s know le,:: :0 
of the transaction has no bearing upon Bitner's liability. 
Stauffer v. Ti Hang Lung & Co., 84 P.2d 209 (Cal. App. 1938, 
M.J.B. Investments v. Coxwell, 611 P.2d 440 (Wyo. 1980). 
For these reasons, therefore, a joint venture clearly 
existed between M. 0. Bitner Co. and Westcor and Bitner Co. 
is now responsible to respondent Bennett for the debt incur,-, 
therein. 
B. The Lower Court Correctly Found that 
Bitner Co. Was Liable for the Wronaful 
Acts Perpetrated by Westcor and Badger 
in Defrauding Bennett. 
Appellant in its Brief states the followina subhead!~' 
"There was no Joint Venture by Estoppel for a Third Part 11 
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r·'cqard tn Bennett. II (;,ppellants' Brief, p. 331. The argument 
1,i·:anccd under th1 s cc;ubooi'.1t is to t'le effect that Bennett 
ne·:er has claimed or al lec:ed that Bitner r'o. was a member of 
the partnership between Westcor and Badger and therefore Bitner 
co. cannot be liable for the actions of that partnership. I Id. I 
It is impossible to resoond directly to the argument raised 
by Appellant since it has formulated a concept which is both 
legally incorrect and which has never been raised by Bennett. 
Bennett has never made a claim that there is any liability on 
the part of M. 0. Bitner Co. by way of estoppel. Partnership 
by estoppel is statutorily defined in §48-1-13, U.C.A and is 
modeled after the Uniform Partnership Act. In order to have 
a partnership by estoppel it is necessary that the person to 
whom the representation is made rely upon such representation 
and believe that person to be a partner. 
239 P. 2d 749 (Utah 1952). 
Bates v. Simpson, 
In this case it is clear that respondent Bennett was never 
told by anyone that Bitner Co. was a partner of Monson, of 
Badger, or of Monson-Badger. Similarly, Bennett never relied 
uoon the existence of M. 0. Bitner Co. in lending the money as 
requested by Monson and Badger. Thus, none of the elements of 
estoppel have ever been claimed by Bennett and therefore the 
discussion by Appellant is irrelevant and meaningless. 
On the other hand, Appellant seems to be stating that 
because Bennett was not aware of the existence of M. O. Bitner 
Co. that it necessarily follows therefore that M. o. Bitner 
Co. cannot be liable for the debts incurred by Westcor. If 
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this is the argument now being advanced by ,\1 L~"llant it 
clearly incorrect. 
It is elementary that joint venturers bear the same r, 
to each other as to partners in a partnership. Hammer 
& Reed Co., 510 P. 2d 1104 (Utah 1973). This Court man '•~•-
ago established that a joint venture is governed by the la~ 
partnership insofar as the rights of the parties are concer:. 0 
Forbes v. Butler, 242 P. 950 (Utah 1925); Lane v. Peterson, 
251 P. 374 (Utah 1926). 
As noted before, the lower court was entirely correct , 
concluding that M. 0. Bitner Co. and Westcor comprised a io1·• 
venture and therefore were essentially partners for purpos~s 
of legal analysis. The objective of the partnership in t~1s 
case was the development of the Park Ridge Estates project. 
Such joint ventures or partnerships are not uncommon. i'.s 
noted by the Oregon Supreme Court in a similar type of case: 
They were engaged in a business venture for 
the development of a subdivision. That business 
venture required construction of curb, grading of 
roads and installation of gas, electricity, sewer 
and water lines. The extensive development of 
property in such a manner, together with the intent 
to exert joint control and share the profits or 
losses, is sufficient to establish a partnership 
or joint venture. Stone-Fox, Inc. v. Vandehev 
Development Co., 626 P.2d 1365 (Ore. 1981). 
The Westcor-M. 0. Bitner Co. partnership is the only rr-
which has been claimed by either plaintiffs or respondent 
Bennett. The relationship of Alonzo Badger to Monson ~as 
that of a sub-partnership. The concept of a sub-nartncrsJ.1_ 
is described as follows: 
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" s1;b-1~artncrshi0 is a so-called partnership 
formed between a men~er of a partnership and a third 
:.erson for a division of the profits coming to him 
from the rartnership enterprise, by an agreement of 
such character as to disclose the essentials necessary 
to a uartnership between the oartner and the third 
nerson. How profits between the me~ers of a sub-
partnership are to be divided is immaterial, and 
the mere fact that the one who is not a partner of 
the original partnership is to receive the entire 
crof1ts of the business will not prevent the forma-
tion of a sub-partnership. The sub-partners are 
par~ners inter se, but a sub-partner does not become 
a member of thef)artnership since there is no agreement 
between him and the other partners, even though the 
sub-partnershiu agreement is known to the other members 
of the firm. 59 Am. Jur.2d, Partners.bl.l:, §16, p. 941. 
The testimony of both ~onson and Badger show unequivocably 
that their relationship was that of a sub-partnership. Alonzo 
Badger represented hi~self at trial and as such cross-examined 
Douglas Monson. The following dialogue occurred: 
Q. (By Mr. Badger) Do you recall the discussion 
in trying to put this venture together where a 
proposal was made that we enter into a partnership 
and that I take a percentage of your share from 
the project? 
.:\. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall what that percentage was? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Was there ever any agreement signed or prepared? 
i\. :Jo. 
but 
You were always going to formalize something, 
you ne\rer did. 
Q. And did you ever make any attempt to formalize or 
A. :Jo. 
Q. Sign any agreement. Do you think that could have 
been the reason that I entered into an agreement 
and pledged $284,000 in assets? 
A. I'm sure it was. 
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Q. And that agreement was never executed, is Lilat 
correct? 
f\. To my knowledae, No. 
(Tr. 399-400 I . 
Likewise, in a dialogue between Mr. Badger and ~r. -~ 
(attorney for both \•lestcor and M. 0. Bitner Co.) the follu,·.1· 
statements were made: 
Q. (By Mr. Davis) All right. Was it your under-
standing under the document (the Summit County 
Escrow Agreement) that you did tell Mr. Murphy 
to sign that you had an obligation of some sort 
relating to Park Ridge Estates? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. In the amount of $284,000? 
A. Absolutely. Absolutely. 
Q. Was that obligation to in some way pay for the 
improvements that go into Park Ridge Estates? 
.'.. No. It was to act as a guarantee that if the 
improvements weren't in that funds could be drawn 
against by the county to pay for the imcrovements 
Q. What was your reason for taking on that obliaat10": 
A. Doug Monson and I had a partnership, verbal partne~­
ship agreement, that was never executed that I woll: · 
participate in his share of the partnership proceed' 
(Tr. 701-702) 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Davis) Now, when you entered into this 
partnership agreement with Mr. Davis, which resul•c 
in you taking on an obligation of $284, 000, 1-1~•at '. : 
you get in return? 
A. I received probably $15,000 or $20,000 in thP SLl" 
of 1980. 
* * * 
Q. In the spring of when? 1980? 
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~:o. 
~1d ':ou :--:a~:e sc:-"e basis :or deli\·er-::.:1"""7 ', s.::.cl ".d--i.3t 
~~e 0:1e-~al~ ~::.;~t be? 
·-'-· 1es. 
Q. ~hat was t~at basis~ 
.0,. Just reviewino the subdivision and the potential 
sales and potential, the estimated development 
costs and the amount of the bond. 
Q. Had you seen the document whereby Westcor ourchased 
the land. 
A. No. 
Q. From~- 0. Bitner Co.? 
A. No, not at that--
Q. What did you estimate Westcor's interest to be 
before you were to get your 50%? What was the full 
amount that Westcor was to receive in your estimation? 
A. I had in mind some half million dollars gross. 
Q. And you were to get half of that? 
A. No. Half of the net. 
Q. Did you understand that Westcor had the obligation 
of putting in--
A. Yes. 
Q. $284' 000? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Westcor then was to receive a half million, and ii 
they put in $284,400 then they were to have roughly 
$250,000? 
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A. That is approximately. 
Q. Then you were to get half of that? 
A. Yes. One half. 
Q. Did you understand that you may have to put out 
the full $284,000? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that calculated in this? 
A. That was in the gross. 
Q. Did you figure then that you would pay this and 
then you would get half of this? 
A. Yes, but I may have to pay the $284,000, yes. 
Q. Okay. Did you receive any contracts to cover the 
$284,000? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was the total face value of those contrac~' 
* * * 
A. Well, I think the records I put up yesterday was 
probably the best estimate. But in addition to 
that there was, there was a couple of other contro:· 
It would have been about $ 250, 000, I would recollec:--
(Tr. 702, 711-713). 
Thus, the testimony is clear that the partnership in t~d' 
case was between Westcor and M. 0. Bitner Co. with a side su~ 
partnership between Westcor and Badger. The liability of ~ 
Bitner Co. is thus predicated on the actions of Monson and 
Westcor in incurring the debt for the benefit of the venture. 
With this clarification of the relationship among ~onso· 
Westcor, M. 0. Bitner Co. and Badger it remains to examine 
whether Bennett's lack of knowledge of the ~- O. Bitner Co. 
relationship is fatal to a claim against this comoany. 
alleges "Bennett neither saw nor could allege that he thouch: 
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there was privit; or any relationshio with or between Bitner 
Co. and his loan." (Appellants' Brief, p. 33). Again, this 
statement is not disputed by res~ondent Bennett since knowledge 
of Bennett as to Bitner Co. 's partnership is immaterial to 
Bitner's liability. 68 C.J .S. Partnership, §16l(c), pp. 606-607. 
In Gardenhire v. Ray, 23 N.E.2d 927 (Ill. 1939) the court 
held that where a partnership relation existed between a 
defendant and a co-defendant for the development of an oil well 
the defendant was liable on a contract executed by the co-
defendant with plaintiff for drilling of the well whether or 
not the plaintiff knew of the defendant's connection with the 
well. 
Likewise, in Raymond S. Roberts, Inc. v. White, 97 A.2d 
245 (Vt. 1953) the Supreme Court of Vermont held that where 
one partner purchases property upon his individual credit for 
the partnership but the seller is not aware of the existence 
of the partnership the seller may, when he discovers it, have 
benefit of the partnership liability. 
Finally, as noted in a leading treatise, the liability of 
an undisclosed joint venture is no different than that of an 
undisclosed partner. 
As in the case of partnerships, the undisclosed 
joint venturer is liable for acts performed by his 
associates providing they are acting within the scope 
of their authority. This is consistent with the general 
rules of agency. §186 of the Restatement of the Law of 
Agency provides: 
An undisclosed principal is bound by contracts 
and conveyances made on his account by an agent 
acting within his authority . . It is elementary 
that the fact that a third person has theretofore 
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dealt with the agent as principal docs ;iot .:iffcct 
the liability of the principal upon disco~cry. 
Even after discovery of the identity of the 
principal, the fact that such a third person 
looks only to the agent for payment or perforrnanc· 
does not affect the principal's liability. 
C.C.H., Business Organizations, §41.10 [2, p. 
1166-67]. 
As noted earlier, it is also immaterial whether or net 
Bitner Co. was aware that Monson had entered into a loan 
agreement with Bennett in order to obtain financing for the 
development. All partners are jointly and severally liable 
for the acts of a partner concerning partnership business. 
Stauffer v. Ti Hang Lung & Co., 84 P.2d 209 (Cal. App. 1938): 
see §48-1-6, U.C.A. (1). For these reasons, therefore, the 
arguments raised by Appellant in its "Estoppel" section are 
without merit and must be rejected. 
C. The Debt Owing to Bennett Was For the 
Benefit of the Park Ridge Estates 
Development and Therefore M. 0. Bitner 
Co. is Liable. 
Next, Appellant argues that even if a joint venture ex1• 
between Bitner Co. and Westcor/Monson that the Bennett oblica-
tion was made solely to another partnership consistina of 
Westcor/Monson and Badger and therefore Bitner is not liable. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 34-35). 
As discussed in the previous section, however, this cha:e 
terization is incorrect. The evidence is undisputed that s~c 
and Monson only entered into an arrangement for the so le f :a 
of sharing the profits from the Park Ridge Estate venture. 
unlike the examples cited in Appellants' Brief, this is n~t • 
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instance ',;here a person is a member of two separate and 
distinct partnerships each havinq a separate and independent 
purpose. 
Alonzo Badger testified that he had been informed by 
Monson that the subdivision investment was faltering because 
Monson was unable to meet the improvement obligations and had 
been served with notices of default by various persons. (Tr. 
6 61) . It was Badger's idea that the needed financing could 
be obtained from Bennett provided that real estate contracts 
could be given to Bennett so that he would feel secure in making 
any loans. Monson verified this testimony and again stated 
that the money was needed in o~der to pay bills on the Park 
Ridge project. (Tr. 370). 
Monson/Westcor was obviously desperate for money in order 
to keep the venture alive. Monson was therefore willing to agree 
with Bennett that if Bennett would lend the necessary cash, 
Westcor would secure the debt obligation with over $200,000 of 
contract receivables, would pay Bennett the full amount borrowed 
plus a previous amount owed to Badger, and would pay the total 
obligation within three months after the loan had been made by 
Bennett. 
Appellants' attempt to create two separate partnership 
entities is fruitless based upon the record. The lower court 
concluded correctly that money given to Monson/Westcor for the 
purpose of developmental expenses was for the benefit of the 
joint venture with Bitner Co. and therefore Bitner Co. was liable 
for this obligation. It is immaterial that the money advanced 
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Crossclaim of Harold Bennett shows t~at no such defense was 
'-'''er raised, (!'. 679-~82). Other affirmative defenses scch 
Js waiver and contributory ne~ligence were clead, however. 
At no time in the trial did Bitner Co. claim that ~onson 
had exceeded his partnerhsip authority by assigning the con-
tracts to Bennett. In fact, quite to the contrary, Bitner Co. 
has argued throughout this litiaation that it has never been 
a partner with Monson/Westcor and therefore is not liable for 
any acts of Monson. 
The failure to raise this defense in the lower court 
precludes Bitner's attempt to now do so in this Court. It is 
fundamental that defenses and claims not raised by the carties 
in the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal. Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983); Heath 
v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979). 
Even assuming arguend~, however, that this defense has 
not been waived, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that 
the Uniform Partnership Act was followed. The CaliLirnia 
~uoreme Court in one of the few cases dealing with that section 
of the Uniform Partnership Act codified as 48-1-6, U.C.A. held 
that there is no requirement that assent to assignment of 
partnershi; procerty for the benefit of a creditor be reduced 
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same period of time, while preparing the defenses in the L"n· 
lawsuit, Monson prepared a record of the assigned lots, 
including those assigned to Bennett and showed them to Dav1r 
(Tr. 3 5 0, 4 2 3) . Blaine Bitner stated that during this sar'," 
period of time he began to suspect that something was seriou 
wrong when people started suing him. (Tr. 224). He furthor 
stated that he did not feel he could trust Monson by the tir• 
the agreement in June of 1980 was made. (Tr. 539). 
In June of 1980 the "Trust Agreement" was executed by 
Westcor and Bitner acting through Douglas Monson and Blaine 
Bitner respectively. Shortly thereafter on July 22 at the 
Jim Lynn hearing, Mr. Davis, again representing M. 0. Bitner 
Co., made a statement to the court that he foresaw a dissiLac_ 
to those parties who had not yet recorded their contracts and 
that he felt it necessary to give some kind of recording on 
the public record to give notice in order to mitigate the 
damages and protect the assets. Davis testified that he was 
referring to the Trust Agreement when he made this statement 
(Tr. 816-817). 
Davis further admitted that on five different occasions 
during the Lynn proceedings he told the court of his concern 
at the time of entering into the Trust Agreement in that 
Badger or whomever held the contracts had assigned them to 
unknown people. (Tr. 828). 
Whether the contracting party to an agreement intendc~ 
to make a person or class of persons a beneficiac is a 1uc'c' 
of fact which must be decided by the trier of fact. Clark · 
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American Standard, Inc., 583 P.2d 618 (Utah 1978). Based upon 
the evidence before the court there was every reason for the 
court to conclude that Bennett fell within the category of 
those persons the hold harmless agreement was designed to 
encompass. Obviously, Bitner Co. through its president or its 
attorney had sufficient knowledge that wrongdoing was prevalent 
as to the real estate contracts held by both Badger and Monson. 
It was reasonable for the court to conclude that Bennett, both 
as a contract holder and as a creditor of the subdivision 
improvements, could be asserting claims against Monson/Westcor 
in the future and that therefore Bitner Co. was assuming such 
obligations. 
Since Bitner Co. negligently placed itself in the position 
of allowing Monson and Badger to cause the chaos and fraud which 
resulted in 1979 and 1980 it is only equitable that Bitner Co. 
be held to an agreement which it entered solely for the purpose 
of eliminating the Monson/Westcor liability and allowing it the 
opportunity to salvage the project and protect it interest. 
(Tr. 208). 
F. The Lower Court Correctly Found Bitner 
Co. Jointly Liable for any Fraudulent 
Conduct Committed by Monson/Westcor. 
Appellant contends that because the lower court found that 
Monson/Westcor and Badger had specifically committed fraud 
against Bennett whereas Bitner Co. neither participated in nor 
was aware of the fraud committed against Bennett, that it is 
therefore improper to assess joint liability against Bitner Co. 
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for the fraud of others. (i\ppellants' Brief, r:r. 38- o9J. 
argument further continues that this JOint liabilit~ was 
necessarily based upon the hold harmless clause of the ~,, 'Jsc 
Agreement and such clause is therefore invalid as a Matt0r 
public policy. (Id.) 
There are two reasons why this argument is invalid. 
the question as to the validity of the hold harmless agre0~~ 
in a fraudulent context is academic since under the laws of 
partnership Bitner Co. is liable for Westcor's fraud regarcl• 0 
of any contractual agreement between the partners. Second, c 
authority relied upon by Appellant is distinguishable and doe• 
not apply to this situation. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered b 
lower court recognize that a debt on behalf of the partners~~ 
was incurred to Bennett. The fraud of Monson and Badger, as 
by Appellant himself (Appellants' Brief, p. 38) in no way a£'e 
the debt but only the security which was given for the debt. 
other words, the contracts which were assigned to Bennett we'" 
dissipated by the fraudulent actions of Monson and Badger. 
elimination of the security, however, does not eliminate t~~ 
underlying debt which still exists to the partnership. 
It is fundamental partnership law that a partnershio is 
bound by a partner's wrongful acts. Section 48-1-10, c.c.: 
states the following: 
Where by any wrongful act or omission of an:· 
partner acting in the ordinary course of the 
business of the partnership or with the authorit·· 
of his co-partners loss or injur~ is caused to a~~ 
person, not being a partner in the partnership, " 
or any penalty is incur red, the oartne rsh i c is 
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liable therefor to the same extent as the partner 
so act1nq or omitting to act. 
In aJdition, Section 48-1-11 provides: 
The partnership is bound to make good the loss: 
(1) where one partner acting within the scope of his 
apparent authority receives money or property of a 
third person and misapplies it; and, (2) where the 
partnership in the course of its business receives 
money or propert:/ of a third person and the money or 
property so received is misapulied by any partner 
while it is in the custody of the partnership. 
finally, Section 48-1-12 provides: 
Act. 
All partners are liable: ( 1) jointly and 
severally for everything chargeable to the partner-
ship under Sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11; ( 2) jointly 
for all other debts and obligations of the partner-
ship; but any partner may enter into a separate 
obligation to perform a partnership contract. 
This statutory concept emanates from the Uniform Partnership 
Courts applying this same act have stated the following: 
There is no merit in the contentions that 
fraudulent concealment by one partner may not be 
imputed to another partner. "The individual partners 
. are liable in a civil action for the fraudulent 
misconduct of a partner within the course or scope 
of the transactions and business of the partnership, 
whether such misconduct be by fraudulent representa-
tions or otherwise, even though the co-partners had no 
knowledge of the fraud and did not participate therein. 
68 C.J.S. Partnership §170, p. 620; Kearns v. Sparks, 
260 S.W2d 353, 360 (Mo. App. 1953). Martin v. Barbour, 
558 S.W.2d 200, 209 IMo. App. 1977). 
See also, A. Sam & Sons Produce Co. v. Campese, 217 N.Y.S.2d 
275 (N. Y. App. 1961). 
Thus, under Utah law and general partnership law concepts 
Bitner Co. is jointly liable for any fraud committed by Monson/ 
Westcor independent of the Trust Agreement which was entered into 
in June of 1980. Appellant's trial counsel acknowledged to 
the lower court that a finding of fraud as to Westcor would be 
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imputed to Bitner Co. (Tr. 976). 
to utilize the Trust Agreement in order to sustain the 1,,,. 
court's finding of joint liability for the Bennett obl1=.,1.1 
Even so, the June 1980 Trust Agreement would st111 f,Jc, 
basis for Bennett's enforcement of any obligation based w'O," 
fraud. The Trust Agreement provided that Bitner Co. aqrr'•'s 
to hold Westcor and Monson harmless of any liability aris1~: 
out of the development of the Park Ridge Estates subdiv1si 
Since the evidence showed that Bitner did not trust Monson 3t 
the time the agreement was made (Tr. 539) and in fact belie"'': 
that Westcor had cheated Bitner Co. as to the original ~ove~· 
1978 agreement (Tr. 225) it is not reasonable to assume t 11at 
Bitner Co. was aware that fraud could have been committed b' 
but nevertheless agreed to make good on such fraud even thouu-
was already obligated to do so under the partnership act. 
On the other hand, as between Monson/Westcor and Bitnec 
the argument now raised by Appellant could certainly be made 
any agreement by Bitner Co. to assume the full responsibilit· 
the partnership debts is invalid since some of these debts :c•:· 
fraudulently induced. The Lamb case cited by Appellant :coui · 
then be applicable because to allow the enforcement of the 
as between lvestcor and Bitner Co. would immunize Westcor •re 
own fraud. Since this question, however, does not conccrr :• 
and since no crossclaim has ever been filed by either vies'"'' 
Bitner Co. against each other the answer to these auestion:: 
irrelevant to this appeal. 
The lower court correctly found that Bitner Co. was ,01:• 
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liable uoon the debt to Bennett under traditional partnership 
law regardless of whether the debt was induced by fraudulent 
means and whether the security for such debt had been fraudulently 
misued by Monson. The obligation on the debt must still be paid 
by Westcor's partner Bitner Co. 
G. The Lower Court was Correct in Declaring 
Bitner Co. Severally Liable for Punitive 
Damages and Attorneys' Fees. 
Finally, Appellant argues that it is improper for Bitner 
Co. to be held liable for punitive damages and for attorneys' 
fees when it did no wrong itself and is in effect punishing an 
innocent party. Likewise, Bitner Co., according to Appellant, 
should not be assessed attorneys' fees since it was not involved 
in the fraud committed by Monson and Badger. (Apoellants' Brief, 
pri. 39-40). 
For the same reasons stated in the previous section this 
argument is without merit. A partnership under §48-1-10, U.C.A. 
is liable for any penalties assessed against a partner "to the 
same extent as the partner so committing or omitting to act." 
Section 48-1-12 provides that all partners are jointly and 
severally liable for everything chargeable to the partnership 
under §48-1-10 and 48-1-11. 
Bitner Co. has misstated the concept of partnership. 
Essentially the law views Bitner Co. and Westcor as one indivi-
dual and it is immaterial whether Bitner Co. was innocent of any 
wrongdoing if it was a partner of Westcor and if Westcor itself 
committed a wrongful act. Partnerships have been held liable 
for assaults by partners (30 A.L.R.2d 859) and for the embezzle-
-44-
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to rely upon the TRust Agreement as one means of obta1ninu 
liability against both entities. 
The Canons of Ethics as quoted by Appellant are sif'l:,J' 
that. They are a guideline to attorneys as to what c0nduct 
they may and may not ethically perform. It was Davis' 0Ll1c1>, 
many years prior to the actual trial of this case to disa~30c 
himself with one or the other client if he believed a COJ1fl::· 
even possibly could have existed. He did not do so, nor JiJ 
any of the respective clients request him to do so. 
It is extremely unlikely that had Bitner Co. prevail~J in 
this trial and had an appeal been prosecuted by these resronacc 
that any claim would then be made that a new trial was req1111" 
because of a conflict of interest by Bitner's attorney. 
Bitner Co. 's decision to retain Davis throughout this lit1~a:: 
and it is therefore Bitner Co. 's problem or Davis' problel'l tc 
certainly is not the problem of either Plaintiffs or res~onJe ' 
Bennett. Since, as noted by the plaintiffs, the lower cour• 
nev~r asked to declare a mistrial because of this conflict, 
it would be a misstatement to say that the lower court corr 0 c: 
denied such mistrial. Perhaps more correctly it could be ':a 
that had Appellants properly raised the issue durinq trial•·~ 
the lower court should certainly ha•1e denied it and an',' iss '"' 
on appeal should be resolved in favor of these resoondent~, 
CONCLUSION 
Entering into a joint venture or a partnership is d 
serious decision. While there are unquestionabl"' numcrou~ 
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advantages that can be derived from such a relationship 
there are also liabilities and disadvantages. In this case 
Bitner Co. failed to exercise reasonable care in selecting 
a company to co-develop the Park City subdivision. Bitner Co. 
failed to check on the background, the assets, or the reliability 
of Westcor or Douglas Monson. Bitner Co. assumed that since it 
still retained title to the land that it had little to lose by 
joining with an unknown entity. 
incorrect. 
This assumption was obviously 
Because of Bitner Co. 's carelessness in placing Monson 
and Westcor in a position to deal with third parties, Bitner 
Co. is jointly and severally liable for the acts and omissions 
of its joint venturer. This liability arises not only from 
traditional laws of partnership but also from Bitner Co. 's 
decision to hold Westcor harmless for any acts concerning its 
involvement with the subdivision. 
After Bitner Co. took over the sole control of the develop-
ment a successful subdivision was completed. Bitner Co., 
according to the testimony of its president, is now financially 
successful in the venture and is receiving income from the 
numerous lots which were sold. (Tr. 540-542). Thus, aside 
from any legal theories or requirements it is only right that 
Bitner Co. compensate both the plaintiffs and respondent 
Bennett for their losses incurred as a resul~ of their involve-
ment with the subdivision. 
In summary, the lower court carefully weighed the evicence 
which was introduced by the parties during a five-day trial. 
-4 8-
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